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Using a long-run series of I-O tables, some simple facts are explored with respect to the 
Italian  trade  balance  in  the  period  1960-2000.  The  analysis  confirms  that  the  Italian 
economy underwent a de-specialisation process before the Euro era. This phenomenon 









1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In a nice technical paper published in 1969
1 professor Vittorio Sirotti investigated the stability 
conditions  of  the  general  equilibrium  of  a  two-country,  two-good  model.  Having  assumed 
homogeneity of the goods across countries and the use of a single currency, equilibrium requires, 
among other things, a relative price such that the quantity of each good exported (imported) by one 
country equals the quantity imported (exported) by the other country. Stability -i.e. the ability of 
price adjustments to bring about this equilibrium- is lucidly proved to hold always, as it happens in 
two-good  economies
2.  Interestingly  enough,  in  this  setting  each  country’s  trade  balance  is  in 
equilibrium by definition: indeed, for each country the value of excess demand (supply) of one good 
coincides with its imports (exports), and by Walras Law the total value of excess demand must be 
identically zero. 
Now, it is clear that relaxing some of the hypotheses carefully stated by professor Sirotti things 
might go differently. Here I mention only some points, driven by casual curiosity related to the 
Italian  case.  First,  assuming  inter-temporal  consumption  choice,  it  can  happen  that  single-year 
                                                
1 Sirotti (1969).  
2 Arrow & Hurwicz (1958), in particular Theorem 6.   2 
national  saving  (hence  the  trade  balance)  is  different  from  zero.  Second,  given  that  different 
countries adopt different currencies, a new price -the exchange rate- enters the determination of 
equilibrium. Third, if a country suffers from international liquidity constraints, it might be the case 
that the exchange rate is tuned to attain year-by-year equilibrium of the trade balance, provided that 
the Marshall-Lerner condition is satisfied. Coupling the first and the third of the above conditions, 
together  with  a  persistent  time-preference  for  current  consumption,  might  provide  a  first 
approximation for interpreting the Italian case during the last decades of the 20
th century. 
In  this  note  an  unsophisticated  route  will  be  taken,  quite  differently  from  professor  Sirotti’s 
theoretical style of 1969. We will enquire into some empirical features related to the long-period 
performance of the Italian trade balance, starting from the so called ‘boom’ and ending with the 
dawn of the Euro era. The “structural” aspect of the story lies in using a long-run dataset of input-
output tables for the Italian economy
3, with data expressed at constant 1978 prices
4. This simple 
analysis  will  confirm  a  well-known  fact,  namely  that  the  Italian  economy  underwent  a  de-
specialisation process before the Euro era. This phenomenon weakened our export capacity, and in 
addition worsened significantly our dependence on non-oil imports. 
 
 
2. SIMPLE FACTS 
 
When evaluated at constant 1978 prices, the Italian trade balance
5 shows a persistent deficit during 
the whole period 1960-2000: on average, the annual volume of exports is 85% of the volume of 
imports. It is often said that this depends on Italy being scarcely endowed with energy resources: 
indeed, when evaluated net of oil imports, the trade balance is overall slightly in surplus, export 
being on average 102% of imports. If one considers, instead, the overall trade balance evaluated at 
current prices, one finds surpluses, or at least balances, in the Sixties and early Seventies, and again 
in the end-Eighties and Nineties: on average exports were 99% of imports. Figure 1 shows these 
facts. 
                                                
3 See G. Rampa (2007), containing a 1959-2000 series of input-output tables for the Italian economy, at both current 
and constant prices. For the deflation methodology, see G. Rampa (2008). 
4 This base-year was chosen because it lies in between the two major oil crises, so that backward and forward price 
indexes do not display excessive fluctuations. 
5 A caveat: differently from the ESA95 methodology, here imports (resp. exports) do not include consumption of 
resident  (resp.  foreign)  persons  while  they  are  abroad  (resp.  in  the  economic  territory).  This,  together  with  some 
revaluation of National Accounts operated after 2000, explains the differences between our figures and those than can 
be derived from more recent datasets.   3 
 
 
Figure 1 − Export/import ratio 
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Considering the overall balance evaluated at current and at constant prices (solid lines, resp. grey 
and black) one sees that during the oil shocks, i.e. the period around our base-year, the two series 
are fairly similar to each other, while they differ significantly in the queues. In other terms: had the 
oil relative price stood the same in the base-year and in the Sixties and Nineties, the Italian trade 
balance would have been much worse than it actually was in the latter periods. Hence, one popular 
view maintains that oil price is a major source of the troubles of our external balance. 
Another well-known feature of the Italian economy, holding until the mid-Nineties, is its inclination 
to domestic currency devaluation. Indeed, the main recovery phases appearing in Figure 1 (apart 
from the 1964-65 one
6) are connected with three major devaluation processes (1975-77, 1981-82 
and 1993-94)
7. Thus, a second popular view is that the entry in the EMS, and a fortiori in the EMU, 
preventing further devaluations, is another major source of our troubles, especially those to be 
observed after 2000. 
Although the two popular views above contain some truth, there is more to be said besides energy 
price fluctuations and exchange rates. Observe that the distance between the two black (solid and 
                                                
6 Notice that the deep fall shown by Figure 1 in the years 1961-63 must not be attributed to any external price shock: it 
depended instead on the very high domestic growth rates (7-8%) compared with world ones, inducing a large decrease 
in net exports. Indeed, while exports grew by 35% between 1960 and 1963, imports grew by 60% in the same years. 
The sharp increase of the export/import ratio following 1963 was due to the strong deflationary policy implemented by 
the Central Bank. 
7 A very simplistic OLS regression of the export/import ratio against the lagged relative export/import price index (with 
constant term) over the period 1960-2000 returns a parameter estimate of −0.42 (p-value = 0.001). This gives support to 
the idea that some form of Marshall-Lerner condition was holding for the Italian trade balance during that period.   4 
dashed) lines of Figure 1, i.e. the contribution of oil and gas imports, is greater during the Sixties 
than during the Nineties, and it tends to decrease steadily. This phenomenon takes place, obviously, 
starting  from  the  oil  shocks;  however  it  continues  also  after  the  counter-shock  (1985-86),  and 
during the Nineties, when the relative oil price was fairly stable
8. As a consequence, the role of 
energy imports becomes less and less important. On the other hand, relative import/output and 
import/export  price  indexes  (not  reported  for  brevity)  would  appear  favourable  to  a  good 
performance of the overall Italian trade balance during the second half of the Nineties. Figure 1 
shows, on the contrary, that things tend to worsen during this period: thus, there must exist some 




3. SOME STRUCTURAL CHANGES 
 
The sharp internationalization process of the Italian economy between 1960 and 2000 almost tripled 
the import-to-output ratio, and more than tripled the export-to-output one (gross output, and data at 
constant prices, are considered): see Table 1. The process underwent a slowdown in the Seventies, 
but accelerated again after the oil shocks. 
 
Table 1 − Imports and exports relative to domestic output 
Year  Import-to-output ratio  Export-to-output ratio 
1960  0.067  0.052 
1965  0.083  0.070 
1970  0.112  0.082 
1975  0.107  0.096 
1980  0.120  0.099 
1985  0.122  0.109 
1990  0.146  0.120 
1995  0.165  0.162 
2000  0.195  0.173 
 
It seemed that the last major devaluation of 1992-3 could turn things right, almost equating exports 
to imports; but this was only a temporary phenomenon: indeed during the last five years imports 
grew more than imports. 
                                                
8 Curiously enough, in 1999 and 2000, when the oil price went significantly up, the volume of oil imports increased 
relatively to total imports. 
9 It is true that the Italian Lira was revaluated by about 12% after 1995; however, entering the EMU, it remained 
devaluated by about 30% with respect to the early Nineties.   5 
As recognised by some short after 1980
10, the oil shocks caused a significant change in the Italian 
productive  system:  the  production  of  some  intermediate  inputs,  involving  energy-intensive 
processes, were decentralised abroad, so that the Italian economy started to loose specialisation in 
sophisticated productions. This is shown by Table 2. 
 
Table 2 − Share of two kinds of products in total imports 
Year  Energy products  Metal and mechanical products 
1960  0.202  0.227 
1965  0.303  0.191 
1970  0.265  0.255 
1975  0.234  0.276 
1980  0.172  0.345 
1985  0.148  0.345 
1990  0.119  0.397 
1995  0.105  0.407 
2000  0.084  0.455 
 
Hence, combining the information of Tables 1 and 2, it turns out that the volume of energy imports 
per unit of domestic output of the whole economy, after doubling between 1960 and 1970, fell back 
in 2000 to its 1960 value (1.5%)
11. On the contrary, the volume of metal and mechanical imports 
per unit of overall domestic output rose from 1.5% in 1960 to almost 9% in 2000. This should be 
considered carefully by those thinking that oil is the main concern as regards the Italian trade 
balance. 
That these changes are due to a de-specialisation trend is confirmed by the following facts. First, the 
role of fixed investment diminished gradually during the whole period: its share in total resources 
declined from 15% in 1960 to 8.5% in 2000, and while it was on average 13.3% before the oil 
shocks, it became on average 9.4% after 1975. Second, although total investment became less and 
less important in the economy, the share of imported investment goods in total investment grew 
dramatically from less than 5% in 1960 to 17.5% in 2000 (on average, it was 6.2% before, and 
12.7% after, 1975). As a result, the share of imported investment goods in total resources more that 
doubled, from 0.7% in 1960 to 1.5% in 2000. 
Third,  and  more  importantly,  one  must  consider  the  role  of  intermediate  goods  in  the  Italian 
economy. The so-called “roundaboutness” of the economy, i.e. its propensity to use intermediate 
goods, is measured by input-output coefficients. Table 3 contains the aggregate I-O coefficients of 
the Italian economy. 
 
 
                                                
10 Heimler-Milana (1984). 
11 Recall that we are considering data at 1978 constant prices.   6 
Table 3 − Aggregate I-O coefficients 
Year  Total inputs  Domestic inputs  Imported inputs 
1960  0.41  0.36  0.05 
1965  0.45  0.38  0.07 
1970  0.46  0.37  0.09 
1975  0.47  0.38  0.09 
1980  0.48  0.39  0.09 
1985  0.49  0.40  0.09 
1990  0.51  0.41  0.10 
1995  0.51  0.38  0.13 
2000  0.53  0.38  0.15 
 
The first column shows that, indeed, the economy became more and more “roundabout”: the use of 
intermediate inputs per unit of gross domestic output increased steadily from 0.41 in 1960 to 0.53 in 
2000. There is, however, a great difference between the coefficient of domestic and that of imported 
intermediate inputs: while the former rose only until the second half of the Eighties, and then 
decreased in the Nineties, the latter went up constantly and tripled passing from 0.05 to 0.15. Notice 
that this growth accelerated in the Nineties, precisely when the coefficient of domestic intermediate 
inputs went down. Hence, imported inputs passed from 11.2% of total intermediate inputs in 1960 
to  27.3%  in  2000.  As  a  further  consequence,  the  actual  aggregate  I-O  multiplier
12  diverged 
increasingly form the “potential” one: the latter is the multiplier that would prevail hypothetically, if 
all intermediate inputs were bought from domestic producers. This is show in Table 4.   
 
Table 4 − The I-O multiplier 
Year  Potential  Actual 
1960  1.69  1.57 
1965  1.80  1.61 
1970  1.86  1.60 
1975  1.87  1.62 
1980  1.92  1.64 
1985  1.97  1.67 
1990  2.05  1.69 
1995  2.04  1.62 
2000  2.11  1.62 
 
The increased roundaboutness of the economy would have implied a rise in the potential multiplier 
by  25%  (from  1.69  in  1960  to  2.11  in  2000);  however,  the  strong  substitution  of  imported 
                                                
12 The aggregate I-O, or Leontief, multiplier measures the amount of domestic total output that is induced by a unit of 
final demand; it is increasing in the aggregate I-O coefficient. Here, multipliers are computed in a rough way: calling a 
the aggregate I-O coefficient, a quick and approximate estimate of the aggregate I-O multiplier is 1/(1−a). A more 
sophisticated computation would be the following: calling A the matrix of I-O coefficients, the aggregate multiplier is 
u’[I− − − −A]
-1d, where u’ is the row sum vector whose elements are all equal to one, and d is the column vector of the 
composition of final demand (that is, u’d = 1).   7 
intermediate inputs for domestic ones interrupted this process after the Eighties, and the actual 
multiplier fell back to the value it had in the Sixties and Seventies, short greater than 1.6. 
All this means that not only the Italian economy became more and more dependent on imported 
inputs, a fact that is obviously common to many economies in the globalisation era: it also became 
less and less capable of translating any push coming from final demand into a substantial domestic 
activity. It should be noticed that this took place in a period when the exchange rate was floating: it 
may thus be expected that the repeated devaluations rendered imports more expensive; but imports 
never ceased to go up
13. 
One might contend that the rapid growth of exports (see Table 1) can counterbalance the increase of 
imports, thus preserving the long-run equilibrium of the trade balance. There are, however, two 
aspects  to  be  noticed.  First,  it  is  well  known  that  the  specialisation  of  Italian  imports  lies  in 
traditional products (food, textiles, leather, shoes, etc.), whose elasticity to world demand is not 
very high. To be sure, there was a period in which more sophisticated mechanical products seemed 
to gain importance in our exports: indeed, between 1960 and 1975 their share grew by about 45%, 
while the share of traditional products grew only by 2%. But after 1975 these trend were reversed: 
the  share  of  mechanical  products  rose  by  only  14%  until  2000,  while  the  share  of  traditional 
products rose by 23%. 
Secondly, one cannot overlook that exports themselves, being a part of final demand, induce a 
certain amount of intermediate imports. Indeed, the intermediate imports induced by exports were 
14.9% of total intermediate imports in 1960: this percentage passed to 26% in 1980, and became 
even 41.3% in 2000. At the same time, as we said above, the ability of final demand, including 
exports, to induce domestic activity went down. 
 
Table 5 − The output and import multiplier of exports 
Year  A. Output  B. Import  A/B 
1960  1.67  0.14  11.9 
1965  1.72  0.20  8.5 
1970  1.70  0.24  7.2 
1975  1.75  0.22  7.8 
1980  1.74  0.23  7.5 
1985  1.75  0.24  7.3 
1990  1.76  0.27  6.6 
1995  1.65  0.31  5.3 
2000  1,62  0.34  4.7 
 
                                                
13 What happened actually is that, apart from 1973-4, domestic prices were growing on average more than import 
prices, thus giving the impression that imports were cheaper.   8 
Table 5 shows the output and the import multipliers
14 of exports from 1960 to 2000. The output 
multiplier of exports (column A) increases until 1990 and decreases afterwards, following the same 
trend as the output multiplier of general final demand (Table 4, “actual” multiplier): however, while 
the former is higher than the latter until 1995, the two become equal in 2000. This means that at the 
end of the period exports loose their superior ability to pull domestic activity. 
The import multiplier of exports (column B of Table 5), on the other hand, keeps increasing for the 
whole period, with a neat acceleration in the Nineties: in 2000 one unit of exports brings about 0.34 
units of imports. The amount of domestic output induced by exports was almost twelve times that of 
imports induced by exports in 1960; this ratio becomes less than five in 2000 (last column of Table 
5). These huge structural changes imply that the traditional “export-led-economy” model, besides 






It  is  sometimes  maintained,  mainly  by  casual  observers,  that  the  main  source  of  the  poor 
performance of the Italian trade balance in the new millennium is the Euro. The scanty analysis put 
forward in this note suggests, on the contrary, that the answer to the question appearing in the title is 
“No”. The seeds of our problems appear to have been planted well before the Euro era, in the period 
when cheap devaluations induced a progressive de-specialisation of our economy. If innovation and 
productivity growth do not come back to the foreground, it seems difficult that the Italian economy 




                                                
14 Call AD and AM the domestic and the imported input coefficient matrices, respectively; let e be the column vector of 
composition of exports (that is, u’e = 1). The output multiplier of exports is computed as u’[I− − − −AD]
-1e, while the import 
multiplier  of exports is  computed  as u’AM[I− − − −AD]
-1e.  Their  meanings are  the  usual  ones:  the  former  measures  the 
amount of domestic output induced, directly and indirectly, by one unit of exports; the latter measures the amount of 
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